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In 1969, the Supreme Court decided Detroit & Toledo Shore Line Railroad v. 
United Transportation Union.2 The Court held that the carrier cannot implement 
a change in the actual, objective working conditions broadly conceived 
throughout the mandatory period of bargaining required under section 6 of the 
RLA. Since this decision, the Supreme Court and the circuit courts of appeals 
have weakened this holding to the point where it seems to have less effect. By 
doing so, the courts also have undermined a principal purpose behind the 
Railway Labor Act. 
I. BACKGROUND OF THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT STATUS QUO REQUIREMENTS 
Under the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"),3 neither the employer nor the labor 
organization may change the status quo [rates of pay, rules or working 
conditions] with regard to existing agreements and practices without first filing 
a notice of such intended change as required by section 6 of the RLA.4 Section 
6 of the RLA provides: 
Carriers and representatives of the employees shall give at least 
thirty days' written notice of an intended change in agreements 
affecting rates of pay, rules, or working conditions, and the time and 
place for the beginning of conference between the representatives of 
1 J.D., Ohio State College of Law, 1989; A.B., University of Michigan, 1985. 
2Detroit & Toledo Shore Line Railroad v. United Transportation Union, 396 U.S. 142 
(1969). 
345 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1995). 
445 u.s.c. § 156 (1995). 
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the parties interested in such intended changes shall be agreed upon 
within ten days after the receipt of said notice, and said time shall be 
within the thirty days provided in the notice. In every case where such 
notice of in tended change has been given, or conferences are being held 
with reference thereto, or the services of the Mediation Board have 
been requested by either party, or said Board has proffered its services, 
rates of pay, rules, or working conditions shall not be altered by the carrier 
until the controversy has been finally acted upon, as required by section 155 
of this title, by the Mediation Board, unless a period of ten days has 
elapsed after termination of conferences without request for or proffer 
of the services of the Mediation Board.5 
In other words, the filing of a section 6 notice triggers a mandatory period of 
bargaining, mediation by theN ational Mediation Board ("NMB") under section 
5 of the RLA,6 and the possible appointment of Emergency Board(s) by the 
President of the United States under section 10 of the RLA? Section 5 of the 
RLA provides in pertinent part: 
In either event the said Board shall promptly put itself in 
communication with the parties to such controversy, and shall use its 
best efforts, by mediation, to bring them to agreement. If such efforts 
to bring about an amicable settlement through mediation shall be 
unsuccessful, the said Board shall at once endeavor as its final required 
action (except as provided in paragraph third of this section and in 
section 10 of this Act [45 U.S.C. 160 (1995)]) to induce the parties to 
submit their controversy to arbitration, in accordance with the 
provisions of this Act. 
If arbitration at the request of the Board shall be refused by one or both 
parties, the Board shall at once notify both parties in writing that its 
mediatory efforts have failed and for thirty days thereafter, unless in 
the intervening period the parties agree to arbitration, or an emergency 
board shall be created under section 10 of this Act [45 U.S.C.160 (1995)], 
no change shall be made in the rates of pay, rules or working conditions or 
established practices in effect prior to the time the dispute arose.8 
Throughout this mandatory period of bargaining required under section 6 of 
the RLA and the mediation process set forth in section 155 including the 30 day 
cooling-off period after the failure of the mediatory efforts, the parties may 
not alter the status quo, i.e., neither party may implement a change in the 
5Jd. (emphasis added). 
645 u.s.c. § 155 (1995). 
7 45 U.S.C. § 160 (1995). Section 9A of the RLA, 45 U.S.C. § 159A (1995), is applicable 
on commuter railroads. 
Bid. (emphasis added). 45 U.S.C. § 155 (1995). 
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actual objective working conditions broadly conceived, whether embodied in 
agreements or not.9 
After the failure of mediation and rejection of the voluntary arbitration, the 
NMB may release the parties to their own devices.lO As mentioned, a thirty day 
cooling off period follows this release by the Board.ll Once the thirty days 
expire, the parties are free to exercise self-help.12 
However, the RLA provides one additional method to resolve the dispute 
between the carrier and the labor organization. Section 10 of the RLA,13 
provides in pertinent part: 
If a dispute between a carrier and its employees be not adjusted under 
the foregoing provisions of this Act and should, in the judgment of the 
Mediation Board, threaten substantially to interrupt interstate 
commerce to a degree such as to deprive any section of the country of 
essential transportation service, the Mediation Board shall notify the 
President, who may thereupon, in his discretion, create a board to 
investigate and report respecting such dispute .... 
. . . After the creation of such board and for thirty days after such board 
has made its report to the President, no change, except by agreement, shall 
be made by the parties to the controversy in the conditions out of which the 
dispute arose.14 
This final dispute resolution mechanism also requires the parties to maintain 
the status quo throughout the emergency board procedure until thirty days 
after the board has made its report to the President. While this mechanism is 
the last statutory dispute resolution procedure, Congress has stepped in after 
the failure of this mechanism to avert the use of self-help, by imposing the 
recommendations of the Board15 or submitting the matter to binding 
arbitration.16 
9 See Shore Line, 396 U.S. 142 (1969). 
1045 u.s.c. § 155 (1995). 
ll[d. 
l2See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 299, 303 
(1989). 
1345 u.s.c. § 160 (1995). 
l4Jd. (emphasis added). 
15Maine Cent. R.R. v. Maintenance of Way Employees, 873 F.2d 425, 428 (1st Cir. 
1989); Maine Cent. R.R. v. Maintenance of Way Employees, 835 F.2d 368, 369 (1st Cir. 
1987); Maine Cent. R.R. v. Maintenance of Way Employees, 813 F.2d 484, 486 (1st Cir. 
1987); Alton&S. Ry. v. Machinists,463 F.2d872,875 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Electrical Workers 
v. Washington Terminal, 473 F.2d 1156, 1158-59 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
16Locomotive Eng'rs v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac., 382 U.S. 423, 431-33 (1986); 
Railroad Trainmen v. Akron & Barberton Belt Co. R.R.,385 F.2d 581,590 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
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These procedures when read with section 2 of the RLA,17 which requires the 
parties "to exert every reasonable effort" to settle disputes "in order to avoid 
any interruptions to commerce," evidence Congress' intent to make this a long, 
drawn-out process.18 These dispute resolution mechanisms have been 
described as an "almost interminable process."19 
The Act's status quo requirement is central to its design. Its immediate 
effect is to prevent the union from striking and management from 
doing anything that would justify a strike. In the long run, delaying 
the time when the parties can resort to self-help provides time for 
tempers to cool, helps create an atmosphere in which rational 
bargaining can occur, and permits the forces of public opinion to be 
mobilized in favor of a settlement without a strike or lockout. 
Moreover, since disputes usually arise when one party wants to change 
the status quo without undue delay, the power which the Act gives the 
other party to preserve the status quo for a prolonged period will 
frequently make it worthwhile for the moving party to compromise 
with the interest of the other side and thus reach agreement without 
0 t 0 t 20 m erruphon o commerce. 
Due to the interminable nature of this process, the party who desires to make 
a change does not want to follow the mandatory negotiation and mediation 
procedures since this process would delay the possible implementation of the 
alteration. Conversely, the party who opposes the change wants the status quo 
procedures to be followed since the change could not be unilaterally made and 
the length of the process may create some bargaining leverage. 
On the other hand, where the change is not subject to the status quo 
provisions of the Railway Labor Act , the party may immediately make the 
change.21 The opposing party can dispute the right to make the change through 
the dispute process set forth in section 3 of the RLA.22 During this arbitration 
dispute process, a party may change immediately and may later have to reverse 
this alteration if a Board of Adjustment decides against its right to make the 
change.23 
Moreover, where a party makes a change which is subject to the status quo 
provisions before exhausting these procedures, the opposing party has the 
17 45 u.s.c. § 152 (1995). 
18See Shore Line, 396 U.S. 142, 149 (1969); Railway Clerks v. Florida E. Coast Ry. Co., 
384 u.s. 238, 246 (1966). 
19 Shore Line, 396 U.S. at 149. 
20Jd. at 150. 
21See Consolidated Rail, 491 U.S. 299,304 (1989) (citing Locomotive Eng'rs v. Missouri 
- Kan.- Tex. R. Co., 363 U.S. 528, 531 (1960)). 
2245 u.s.c. § 153 (1995). 
23Consolidated Rail, 491 U.S. at 310. 
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right to exercise self-help.24 As a result, the parties constantly argue over 
whether a change is subject to the notice, negotiation and mediation process 
versus the arbitration dispute process. The question that often arises is whether 
a dispute or change is subject to the status quo dispute resolution mechanisms 
or the Adjustment Board dispute resolution process. 
In response to this crucial question, the courts have developed terms, which 
are not included in the statutory language, to characterize these two different 
types of disputes under the Railway Labor Act. A "major dispute" concerns an 
intended change in agreements affecting rates of pay, rules or working 
conditions and is subject to the mandatory negotiation and mediation 
provisions of the RLA.25 A "minor dispute" involves matters arising "out of 
grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements" and is 
disposed of through the RLA' s arbitration provision.26 Usually, the carrier takes 
the position that a dispute is "minor" since it can then immediately implement 
the change. The union in certain instances claims that the dispute is major, 
which denies the carrier the right to make the change without going through 
the long dispute resolution process. Moreover, if it is major, the union can 
exercise self-help in the event that a carrier makes an unauthorized change. 
The Supreme Court originally described these terms in Elgin, Joliet & Eastern 
Railway v. Burley:27 
The first relates to disputes over formation of collective agreements or 
efforts to secure them. They arise where there is no such agreement or 
where there is sought to change the terms of one, and therefore the 
issue is not whether an existing agreement controls the controversy. 
They look to the acquisition of rights for the future, not to assertion of 
rights claimed to have vested in the past. 
The second class, however, contemplates the existence of a collective 
agreement already concluded or, at any rate, a situation in which no 
effort is made to bring about a formal change in terms or to create a 
new one. The dispute relates either to the meaning or proper 
application of a particular provision with reference to a specific 
situation or to an omitted case. In the latter event the claim is founded 
upon some incident of the employment relation, or asserted one, 
independent of those covered by the collective agreement, e.g., claims 
on account of personal injuries. In either case the claim is to rights 
28 
accrued, not merely to have new ones created for the future. 
24Jd. at 303. 
2545 u.s.c. § 156 (1995). 
2645 u.s.c. § 153. 
27325 u.s. 711 (1945). 
28325 U.S. at 723. 
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While the language in Elgin Joliet which discusses the size of the issue as 
significant is confusing, the Supreme Court has clarified any debate by stating 
the level of impact of a dispute does not relate to a decision on whether an issue 
is "major" or "minor. "29 
Though the difference between a "major" and "minor" dispute became more 
distinct in Elgin Joliet, a party could blur this distinction by filing a section 6 
notice when a dispute arose where the labor organization or carrier wanted to 
maintain the status quo. On the other hand, a party who wanted to make a 
change without delay could assert that the dispute was subject to the 
arbitration procedure.30 As a result, the courts began to ignore these 
manipulations by the parties and focus on the true nature of the controversy. 
The Second Circuit described its solution to this dilemma: 
[W]e must not place undue emphasis on the contentions or maneuvers 
of the parties. Management will assert that its position, whether right 
or wrong, is only an interpretation or application of the existing 
contract. Unions, on the other hand, will obviously talk in terms of 
change. Since a section 6 notice is required by the statute in order to 
initiate a major dispute, the labor representatives are likely to serve 
such a notice in any dispute arising out of any ambiguous situation so 
as thereby to make the controversy appear more like a major dispute.31 
As a result, in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, the 
Supreme Court established a standard to determine whether a dispute was 
"major" or "minor": 
Where an employer asserts a contractual right to take the contested 
action, the ensuing dispute is minor if the action is arguably justified 
by the terms of the parties collective-bargaining agreement. Where in 
contrast, the employer's claims are frivolous or obviously 
insubstantial, the dispute is major.32 
In this case, the carrier decided to unilaterally implement a urinalysis drug 
screening test as part of all periodic and return-from-leave physical 
examinations. The Railway Labor Executives' Association denied that Conrail 
had the right to unilaterally implement this drug screening test. The Court 
applied the standard quoted above to determine whether the dispute was 
"major" or "minor." While neither party relied on an express provision of the 
collective-bargaining agreement to justify its position, the Court found 
Conrail's contractual claim to be "arguably justified" based "solely upon 
29Consolidated Rail, 491 U.S. at 305. 
30See id. at 305-06. 
31Rutland Ry. Corp. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 307 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1962). 
32491 U.S. at 307. 
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implied contractual terms, as interpreted in light of past practice."33 Based on 
this finding, the Court declared this dispute to be "minor." 
As written by Congress, the status quo requirement requires the parties to 
maintain the status quo [rates of pay, rules or working conditions] for a long 
period of time during the negotiation process. However, Consolidated Rail 
appears to allow the carrier to change working conditions if it is "arguably 
justified" in making the change. This result to some extent appears to conflict 
with RLA's central design as set forth in Shore Line to maintain the status quo 
during the negotiation process. 
II. THE SHORE LINE DECISION 
It is undisputed that Consolidated Rail provided the new standard for 
establishing whether a dispute was "major" or "minor." However, the 
interesting question arises with respect to what effect this decision and others 
have had on the holding regarding the status quo in Shore Line.34 
In Shore Line, a 1969 case, the carrier and the union were engaged in 
mediation before the National Mediation Board after the union had served a 
section 6 notice on the carrier regarding the location of work assignments. 
While the parties were in mediation, the carrier posted a notice creating work 
assignments which were the subject of the dispute in RLA section 5 mediation. 
The labor organization as a result threatened to strike. The railroad in response 
sought to enjoin the union from striking whereas the union counterclaimed for 
an injunction against the carrier denying its right to create the disputed 
outlying work assignments. 
The carrier argued that since the collective-bargaining agreement did not 
expressly forbid the creation of these assignments, the status quo requirement 
["rates of pay, rules, or working conditions shall not be altered"] did not apply. 
In other words, the carrier proposed that the status quo provisions only applied 
to working conditions specifically covered in existing collective-bargaining 
agreements. The union countered that the actual objective working conditions 
out of which the dispute arose, irrespective of whether these conditions were 
covered in the existing collective-bargaining agreement, must be maintained. 
The Supreme Court ruled that the union's position was correct and held that 
the "obligation of both parties during a period in which any of these status quo 
provisions is properly invoked [2 First, 5, 6, 10] is to preserve and maintain 
unchanged those actual objective working conditions, broadly conceived, 
which were in effect prior to the time the pending dispute arose and which are 
involved in or related to that dispute."35 The Court's position regarding the 
33Jd. at 312. 
34396 u.s. 142 (1969). 
35Shore Line, 396 U.S. at 153-54. 
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status quo provisions' application to past practice which amounts to implied 
contractual terms has certainly not changed.36 
However, Shore Line also provides that if a union properly serves a section 6 
notice regarding a working condition or practice, the carrier cannot change that 
working condition or practice while the status quo procedures run their 
course.37 This holding seems to be nothing more than what the status quo 
provisions of the RLA expressly provide. 
The Court in Shore Line makes no mention of a carrier's right to change the 
working condition or practice when the procedures have been properly 
invoked where the action is "arguably justified" by the terms of the parties' 
collective-bargaining agreement.38 Therefore, it appears, based on the 
reasoning in Shore Line, that a carrier should not be able to change a working 
condition or practice that is the subject of the major dispute resolution 
procedures even if the "arguably justified" standard is satisfied. The status quo 
requirement holding in Shore Line, therefore, seems to conflict with the 
"arguably justified" standard in Consolidated Rail when the major dispute 
resolution process has been properly invoked. 
The Supreme Court in Shore Line reasoned with regard to the carrier's 
attempt to change the status quo during the major dispute resolution 
procedure: 
The Shore Line's interpretation of the status quo requirement is also 
fundamentally at odds with the Act's primary objective the prevention 
of strikes. This case provides a good illustration of why that is so. The 
goal of the [labor organization] was to prevent the Shore Line from 
making outlying assignments, a matter not covered in their existing 
collective agreement. To achieve its goal, the union invoked the 
procedures of the Act. The railroad, however, refused to maintain the 
status quo and, instead, proceeded to make the disputed outlying 
assignments. It could hardly be expected that the union would sit idly 
by as the railroad rushed to accomplish the very result the union was 
seeking to prohibit by agreement. The union undoubtedly felt it could 
resort to self-help if the railroad could, and, not unreasonably, it 
threatened to strike. Because the railroad prematurely resorted to 
self-help, the primary goal of the Act came very close to being defeated. 
The example of this case could no doubt be multiplied many times. It 
would be virtually impossible to include all working conditions in a 
collective-bargaining agreement. Where a condition is satisfactorily 
tolerable to both sides, it is often omitted from the agreement, and it 
has been suggested that this practice is more frequent in the railroad 
industry than in most others. When the union moves to bring such a 
36See Consolidated Rail, 491 U.S. 312. 
37396 U.S. at 153-54. 
38See Consolidated Rail, 491 U.S. at 307. 
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previously uncovered condition within the agreement, it is absolutely 
essential that the status quo provisions of the Act apply to that working 
condition if the purpose of the Act is to be fulfilled. If the railroad is 
free at this stage to take advantage of the agreement's silence and resort 
to self-help, the union cannot be expected to hold back its own 
economic weapons, including the strike. Only if both sides are equally 
restrained can the Act's remedies work effectively?9 
311 
Since the status quo requirements have not changed since this decision, the 
reasoning in Shore Line still should ring true. However, the courts seemed to 
have now wrongfully eroded the Shore Line standard to such an extent that both 
sides clearly are not equally restrained from exercising self-help and the carrier 
can prematurely act based on Consolidated Rail, thereby defeating the primary 
goal of the RLA. 
Ill. THE EFFECT OF THE SUPREME COURT'S SUBSEQUENT RLA STATUS Quo 
DECISIONS ON SHORE LINE 
It is difficult to reconcile the Shore Line Court's reasoning regarding status 
quo obligations during the major dispute resolution process with the "arguably 
justified" standard set forth in Consolidated Rail. If the "arguably justified" 
standard does apply while the parties are pursuing the section 6 dispute 
resolution process, then the reasoning just quoted above from Shore Line seems 
to be at risk. 
In this event, when the union serves a section 6 notice regarding a previously 
uncovered condition, the essential status quo requirement of the RLAdescribed 
in Shore Line can easily be side-stepped by a clever employer who can devise a 
justifiable argument for its unilaterally implemented change of the disputed 
working condition or practice. Accordingly, a primary objective of the Act, 
which is the status quo requirement, would be defeated since the railroad 
seems free at this stage to prematurely take advantage of the agreement's 
silence by making this unilateral change if it can come up with a sufficient 
argument. As a result, the union would still be required to hold back its own 
economic weapons, including the strike. Thus, both sides would not be equally 
restrained, and the Act's remedies would not be effective if the status quo 
provisions could be avoided by the employer in this manner. 
Since Consolidated Rail clearly involved different facts, as the unilateral 
change by the carrier took place without any section 6 notice being served by 
the union regarding the disputed action, the holding in this case is clearly 
distinguishable from Shore Line. The Supreme Court in Consolidated Rail did not 
really discuss Shore Line at any length. "It did note that the express status quo 
requirement imposed by section 2 of the RLA, 45 U.S.C. § 152, only applied to 
major disputes and had no direct application to a minor dispute. However, this 
language was in reference solely to maintenance of the status quo pending an 
39396 U.S. at 154-55 (footnotes omitted). 
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Adjustment Board decision."40 As a result, Consolidated Rail does not appear to 
explicitly overrule or even criticize the holding in Shore Line. However, the 
general holding in Consolidated Rail, if it is applied when the parties have 
entered the status quo dispute resolution process, would seem to significantly 
weaken the holding in Shore Line, though without specific mention by the 
Court. 
Subsequently, in Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R. Co. v. Railway Labor Executives' 
Association ("P&LE"),41 the Supreme Court seemed to criticize the holding in 
Shore Line. P&LE involved a carrier's decision to sell itself and to cease to be a 
railroad employer. In response, various unions served section 6 notices 
proposing changes in existing agreements to lessen the proposed sale's adverse 
effect on employees. The carrier refused to bargain about the effects of the sale 
claiming that the transaction was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission. The Railway Labor Executives' Association 
("RLEA") filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment regarding P&LE's 
obligations to bargain over the effects of the sale and asked for an injunction 
against the sale until the carrier's bargaining obligations under the RLA were 
completed. Shortly thereafter, the unions went on strike, and the P&LE sought 
a strike injunction. Subsequently, P&LE obtained an exemption from the prior 
approval requirements of 49 U.S.C. 10901 from the Interstate Commerce 
Commission, the federal regulatory agency which, inter alia, approves the sale 
of railroad carriers, which exemption caused the sale to be effective pursuant 
to the Interstate Commerce Act. 
The Supreme Court reviewed whether P&LE's sale should be enjoined until 
the carrier satisfied a duty to bargain under the RLA about the effects of the 
sale. The Court held that since there was no agreement or implied agreement 
not to sell, the carrier had no obligation to serve a section 6 notice about this 
change. Also, the Court found P&LE had no obligation to bargain about the 
sale or delay its implementation. The Court, in making this decision, discussed 
the RLEA's argument that Shore Line forbade a change in the status quo once 
the unions had filed a section 6 notice. In rejecting this position, the court recited 
the facts in Shore Line and reasoned: 
Shore Line, in our view, does not control these cases. In the first place, 
our conclusion in that case that the status quo provisions required 
adherence not only to working conditions contained in express or 
implied agreements between the railroad and its union but also to 
conditions "objectively" in existence when the union's notice was 
served, and that otherwise could be changed without violating any 
agreement, extended the relevant language of 156 to its outer limits, 
and we should proceed with care before applying that decision to the 
facts of this case. Second, reporting at Lang Yard, we thought, had been 
the unquestioned practice for many years, and we considered it 
40Consolidated Rail, 491 U.S. at 304-05 n.5. 
41491 u.s. 490 (1989). 
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reasonable for employees to deem it sufficiently established that it 
would not be changed without bargaining and compliance with the 
status quo provisions of the RLA. Third, and more fundamentally, the 
decision did not involve a proposal by the railroad to terminate its 
business. Here, it may be said that the working conditions existing 
prior to the 156 notice was that P&LE was operating a railroad through 
the agency of its employees, but there was no reason to expect, simply 
from the railroad's long existence, that it would stay in business, 
especially in view of its losses, or that rail labor would have a 
substantial role in the decision to sell or in negotiating the terms of the 
sale. Whatever else Shore Line might reach, it did not involve the 
decision of a carrier to quit the railroad business, sell its assets, and 
cease to be a railroad employer at all, a decision that we think should 
have been accorded more legal significance than it received in the 
courts below. Our cases indicate as much.42 
313 
Obviously, the Supreme Court's use of the term "outer limits" in describing 
Shore Line limited the holding in that case. Moreover, regarding the second 
point, the Supreme Court appears to say that in Shore Line, the dispute was 
assumed to involve a major dispute, because the carrier did not assert a minor 
dispute argument. However, the court's rejection of the Shore Line argument in 
P&LE seems to almost exclusively rely on the third point, that an employer's 
"decision to close down a business is so much a management prerogative that 
only an unmistakable expression of congressional intent will suffice to require 
the employer to postpone a sale of its assets pending the fulfillment of any duty 
it may have to bargain over the subject matter of union notices such as were 
served in this case."43 Thus, the Supreme Court did limit the holding in Shore 
42491 U.S. at 506. However, in a footnote referencing the first point regarding Shore 
Line, the P&LE Court stated: 
Section 156 deals with bargaining and settlement procedures with 
respect to changes in agreements affecting rates of pay, rules, or work-
ing conditions. There must be notice of such intended changes, 
as well as bargaining and mediation if requested or proffered. And in 
every case involving such notice, i.e., of intended changes in agreements, 
rates of pay, rules or working conditions shall not be changed by the 
carrier until the specified procedures are satisfied. Because 156 concerns 
changes in agreements, it is surely arguable that it is open to a construc-
tion that would not require the status quo with respect to working condi-
tions that have never been the subject of an agreement, expressed or 
implied, and that, if no notice of changes had been served by the union, 
could be changed by the carrier without any bargaining whatsoever. 
Shore Line rejected that construction, but as indicated in the text, we 
are not inclined to apply Shore Line to the decision of P&LE to go out of 
business. 
Id. at 506 n.15. 
43 P&LE, 491 U.S. at 509 (citing Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 
(1965)). 
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Line, but only specifically with respect to the facts in P&LE: a sale of a railroad 
business. 
Generally, however, the Court's holdings in P&LE and Consolidated Rail 
appear to have eroded the status quo requirement in Shore Line. This erosion 
developed further from the lower courts' decisions which seemed to begin to 
render Shore Line less meaningful. 
IV. RELATED CASE LAW ALSO SEEMS TO DEMONSTRATE THE EROSION OF THE 
SHORE LINE HOLDING 
In various cases, the courts have examined issues involving different facts 
from Shore Line and examined the applicability of the status quo requirement 
in that context. For example, some courts have examined a related issue 
regarding an air carrier's ability to change a working condition which is the 
subject of a section 6 notice after the expiration of a collective-bargaining 
agreement. In Air Cargo, Inc. v. Local Union 851, Intern. Brother ofTeamsters,44 the 
court held that where the contract between the parties had expired, disputes 
over weekends and overtime work during layoffs and place of reporting to 
work were found to be major disputes since the parties had served section 6 
notices requiring maintenance of the status quo. The court held that a party to 
a major dispute may not introduce a disputed practice pending the exhaustion 
of the notice, negotiation and mediation procedures set forth in the RLA.45 The 
court in this case appears to rely on the reasoning in Shore Line in characterizing 
the dispute as major even though it seems apparent that the carrier had an 
arguable position. 
Similarly, in International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Aloha 
Airlines, Inc.,46 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that where a 
collective-bargaining agreement had expired and a section 6 notice was filed, 
a disagreement over wages was a major dispute. The court stated that "[t]he 
purpose of the status quo provision is to impose an obligation on the parties to 
make every reasonable effort to negotiate a settlement and to refrain from 
altering the status quo until the period ends."47 The court concluded that 
"[ o ]nee a Section 6 notice is filed and after the collective-bargaining agreement 
terminates, neither party may alter the condition of employment in effect, but 
must maintain the 'status quo' during the course of settlement."48 
However, it is important to note in these two cases that the 
collective-bargaining agreement had expired, and as a result, the court could 
not look to the contract to determine whether the dispute was "major" or 
"minor" because there was technically no existing collective-bargaining 
44733 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1984). 
45Jd. at 245. 
46776 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1985). 
47Jd. at 816 (citing Shore Line, 396 U.S. at 149). 
48Afoha Airlines, 776 F.2d at 816. 
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agreement to interpret. On the other hand, these decisions do seem to uphold 
the reasoning in Shore Line with regard to the status quo requirement. 
However, after Consolidated Rail and P&LE,49 the court stated: 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ... rejected 
Aloha, finding no reason why a dispute that is independent of the 
collective-bargaining agreement and occurs after the twin occurrences 
of contract expiration and a section 6 filing should be automatically 
treated as major when, a short time earlier, it would unquestionably 
have been found to be minor .... It also reasoned that such a dispute 
does not look toward "the acquisition of rights for the future," the 
traditional standard for finding a major dispute but only towards 
"rights claimed to have vested in the past," which normally indicated 
only a minor dispute. More importantly, the court noted that the 
Railway Labor Act sets forth two tracks for resolving disputes: 
arbitration for minor disputes and district court jurisdiction for major 
ones. It then pointed out that "[t]he expiration of the 
collective-bargaining agreement tells little or nothing about the track 
for which a dispute is suitable." Instead, the Aloha rule implies that once 
the agreement expires and a section 6 notice is filed, no dispute can ever 
proceed along the "minor" track. 
We agree with the reasoning of Eastern Air Lines and also reject Aloha 
.... To follow Aloha would mean that every dispute, no matter how 
firmly based in the existing but expired contract and no matter how 
insignificant, would become a major dispute subject to federal court 
jurisdiction. The Aloha rule upsets settled law governing 
post-expiration disputes that the mere filing of a section 6 notice does 
not tum a minor dispute into a major one. We see no valid reason for 
making an exception to that rule merely because of the "twin 
occurrences" of contract expiration and section 6 filing.50 
In other words, the Miklavic court held, that the mere submission of an RLA 
section 6 notice to bargain, coupled with the expiration of a 
collective-bargaining agreement, would not automatically transform every 
dispute into a major one, especially if the dispute concerned competing 
interpretations of the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement or if the 
employer could demonstrate that it was "arguably justified" in taking the 
complained of unilateral action by the provision of an agreement. 
This line of cases all involved disputes in the airline industry where contracts 
expire at a specified date. However, in the rail industry, collective-bargaining 
agreement's generally do not expire.51 As a result, the twin occurrence of a 
49Miklavic v. U.S. Air, Inc., 21 F.3d 551 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Airline Pilots Ass'n v. 
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 863 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). 
50Miklavic, 21 F.3d. at 554-55 (internal citations omitted). 
51 See Railway and Airline Supervisors v. Soo Line R.R., 891 F.2d 675, 678 (8th Cir. 
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section 6 notice with the expiration of the agreement is highly unlikely, and 
these cases are generally not too helpful in that context. Moreover, the court in 
Aloha seemed to base its holding on the fact that there was no 
collective-bargaining agreement to interpret after the expiration. In sum, the 
reasoning in Miklavic, supra, and Eastern, supra, seems to conflict with the 
holding in Shore Line with regard to the effect the service of a section 6 notice 
has on the status quo; however, Air Cargo and Aloha, which are both 
pre-Consolidated Rail and P&LE, both seem to require the maintenance of the 
status quo requirement after the service of a section 6 notice without regard to 
the carrier's position. 
In another line of related cases, courts have examined the applicability of the 
reasoning in Shore Line when the union is newly certified and a 
collective-bargaining agreement has not been reached. In Aircraft Mechanics 
Fraternal Ass'n v. Atlantic Coast Airlines, Inc.,52 the court found that the status 
quo provisions of the RLA "simply do not impose an obligation on the carrier 
to maintain the status quo in the absence of an agreement" (emphasis by court). 
The court reasoned that Shore Line only applied when a collective-bargaining 
agreement was in effect.53 
However, in International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. 
Transportes Aeroes Mercantiles Pan Americandos,54 the court, applying Shore Line's 
reasoning, held that section 2 first prohibited the carri~r from making unilateral 
changes in working conditions after the onset of negotiations with a newly 
certified representative. In this case, bargaining had already begun between the 
parties and a prior, unratified agreement existed. As a result, the court reasoned 
that Williams was inapplicable and the holding in Shore Line applied because 
"[i]f management is permitted to make unilateral changes in working 
conditions during collective bargaining, the union's position will be 
undermined, interruptions to interstate commerce are likely to occur, and the 
purposes of the act will be frustrated."55 The court makes no mention of 
whether the carrier's position is arguable.56 The decision in Transportes Aeroes 
seems to hold that Shore Line still has meaning, as do Air Cargo and Aloha. 
1989). 
5255 F.3d 90, 93 (2nd Cir. 1995). 
53Jd. (citing Williams v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 315 U.S. 386,402-03 (1942)) ("The 
prohibition on unilateral changes set forth in these sections are aimed at preventing 
changes in conditions previously fixed by collective-bargaining agreements"); see also 
International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Trans World Airlines, 839 
F.2d 809, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Virgin Atlantic Airways v. National Mediation Bd., 956 
F.2d 1245, 1253 (2d Cir. 1992); Regional Airline Pilots v. Wings W. Airlines, 915 F.2d 
1399 (9th Cir. 1990); International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. 
Northwest Airlines, Inc., 843 F.2d 1119 (8th Cir. 1988); Automotive, Petroleum and 
Allied Industries Employees Union v. Trans States Airlines, 926 F. Supp. 869 (E. D. Mo. 
1996); Tee v. UAL Corp., 902 F. Supp. 1572 (N.D. Ga. 1995). 
54924 F.2d 1005 (11th Cir. 1991). 
55Jd. at 1009. 
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V. LANGUAGE IN VARIOUS CIRCUITS CONFLICT WITH THE HOLDING 
IN SHORE LINE 
317 
Many courts have conflicted the Shore Line holding regarding the status quo 
requirement where a section 6 notice has been served. 57 In Airline Pilots Ass'n 
v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.SB and numerous other cases, the courts have reasoned 
that allowing a party "to characterize all disputes as 'major' through a 
unilateral action such as serving section 6 notices on the other party is unwise 
and contrary to the two-track procedure of the [Railway Labor Act]."59 In fact, 
in Missouri Pacific, the court held that "Shore Line is not applicable ... as the 
employer in Shore Line did not assert any reliance on past practices and the 
possibility of minor dispute was not addressed.60 
While the Eighth Circuit clearly appears to call into question the viability of 
the holding regarding the status quo requirement in Shore Line, the other cases, 
like RLEA v. CSX, CNW v. RLEA, CSX v. UTU, and RLEA v. Chesapeake, all relate 
to a carrier's decision to leave the railroad business as in P&LE.61 Generally, 
the courts recognize that these cases are distinguishable from Shore Line because 
of the carrier's decision to leave the railroad business. Therefore, while the 
language in these holdings is damaging to Shore Line, they do not explicitly 
overrule the holding. 
Some of the cases like Air Cargo, Aloha, and Transportes Aeroes seem to still 
follow the holding in Shore Line that a railroad must maintain the status quo 
with respect to "actual objective working conditions ... , irrespective of whether 
56 See also Northwest Airlines, 843 F.2d at 1127 (dissent). 
57 See Brotherhood of Ry. Carmen v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 944 F.2d 1422,1427-28 
(8th Cir. 1991) (citing Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. Burlington Northern R.R., 893 
F.2d 199,202 (8th Cir. 1990); Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Railway Labor Executives' 
Ass'n, 908 F.2d 144, 151 (7th Cir. 1990); Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. Chesapeake 
W. Ry., 915 F.2d 116, 120 (4th Cir. 1990); CSX v. United Transportation Union, 879 F.2d 
990, 997 (2d Cir. 1989) (once a dispute is found to be minor, the service of section 6 notices 
"would have no transforming or alchemizing effect upon that situation"); Airlines Pilots 
Int'l v. Eastern Airlines, 863 F.2d at 900 (agreement had expired); see also Chicago and 
North Western Transp. Co. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 820 F.2d 
1424 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing Brotherhood of Ry. Carmen, v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 745 F.2d 
370, 376 n.6 (1984) (where the union argued that the carrier had previously raised the 
issue through the major dispute provisions of section 6, even though no section 6 notice 
was pending, the court rejected that this carrier action necessarily makes the dispute 
"major"); St. Louis Sw. Ry. v. United Transportation Union, 646 F.2d 230,233-34 (6th Cir. 
1981). 
58863 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
59 Id. at 900; see also Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. CSX Transp. Inc., 938 F.2d 
224 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Brotherhood of Ry. Carmen v. Alton & Southern Ry. Co., 849 F.2d 
1111 (8th Cir. 1988). 
60944 F.2d at 1427 n.5. 
61See also Airline Pilots, 863 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (involving an action where the 
agreement had expired). 
15Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1998
318 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:303 
these conditions are covered in an existing collective agreement."62 Therefore, 
while the holding in Shore Line appears to have been partially swept away by 
these cases which seem to ignore the primary objective of the RLA- the status 
quo requirement - the Supreme Court has not expressly overruled Shore Line 
and the circuit courts' should respect this important holding. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The courts now generally ask whether the collective-bargaining agreement 
can arguably be interpreted to permit the railroad to do what it wants to do. 
As a result, the courts ignore the status quo rule in Shore Line which seems to 
have been conflicted by many courts. 
However, it seems that when long standing practice ripens into an 
established and recognized custom between the parties, it ought to be protected 
against sudden and unilateral change. The erosion of Shore Line has hurt that 
protection that the status quo requirements of the RLA were put in place to 
provide. Moreover, when a section 6 notice is served and a carrier can 
prematurely make a unilateral change regarding the matter in dispute based 
on Consolidated Rail, this situation creates an unfair advantage for the carrier. 
This unfair advantage is clearly created because the carrier can exercise 
self-help whereas the union cannot strike. As a result, the carrier gains the 
upper hand during negotiations because it is not equally restrained by the 
status quo provisions. 
This result would strike at the RLA's design to prevent the union from 
striking and management from doing anything that would justify a strike. If 
the parties are pursuing the major dispute resolution procedures, and the 
carrier unilaterally implements a change in working conditions, the union is 
obviously going to be upset and talks could break down as a result. Moreover, 
the union should have the right to strike at this moment based on the carrier's 
action in order to maintain the balance in the bargaining procedure. However, 
if the carrier can arguably justify its change, the union may not be able to which 
seems unfair. 
Therefore, the weakening of the holding in Shore Line has severely injured 
the negotiation balance by tipping the scales in favor of the employer. As a 
result, the unions have been placed in a frustrating position since it appears 
that the carrier is free to act and the union must sit on its hands. 
Unless the courts begin to reevaluate the unfair situation they have created 
by ignoring the status quo requirement of the RLA described in Shore Line and 
clearly provided in the RLA status quo procedures, the balance will continue 
to tip in favor of the employer during negotiations and the purpose of the RLA' s 
dispute resolution procedures will continue to be undermined. This cannot be 
what Congress envisioned when the RLA was drafted. Since the Supreme 
Court has not explicitly overruled Shore Line and certain courts seem to apply 
Shore Line in certain situations, the door is still open to correct this problem. 
62Shore Line, 396 U.S. at 143. 
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